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Abstract: This research is the first to empirically analyse the characteristics of firms that defer the social 
security contribution for their employees to the Vietnam Social Security Agency, which is a chargeable 
offense starting 2018 as the Vietnam government focuses on ensuring worker welfare. Using data on 873 
public firms headquartered in four major cities (Ha Noi, Ho Chi Minh, Da Nang, and Hai Phong), we find 
that non-state-owned firms and firms with lower profitability and higher debts are more likely to be in 
arrears on social security contribution. On the other hand, the roles of foreign ownership, size, number of 
employees, and number of branches/offices are insignificant. We further show that being social security 
contribution indebted would negatively affect shareholders’ interest as it is associated with lower firm 
market values. 
Keywords: social security contribution, worker welfare, state ownership, foreign ownership, firm market 
value 
1 Introduction  
Firms failing to comply with their social security contribution scheme poses a serious threat 
to both employees and government [8, 15]. Such failure affects the ability of the state’s pension 
fund to ensure the retirement income for workers and their dependents. It may also lead to the 
government having to subsidy the pension fund by using other sources of revenue. As a result, 
there have been a number of studies on the important topic of which types of firms are more 
likely to evade contribution and what are the underlying reasons [1, 8, 15]. Yet, to the best of our 
knowledge, there has been virtually no empirical study at the firm level. The reason, as 
McGillivray points out, is the lack of consistent data since contribution evasion is designated 
illegal by most governments [15]. One exception is the study by Nyland et al., which investigates 
the characteristics of firms that underpay their contribution [17]. The analysis, however, is limited 
to three explaining variables (the type of ownership, industry, and number of employees). This 
paper aims to fill the gap in the literature by expanding the empirical test to other firm-level 
factors that influence social security contribution. 
After Doi Moi 1986, when the transformation to the market economy has drawn so many 
changes, including the social security system for employees, Vietnam’s government declared its 
determination to build a strong social security system. The 2006 social security law and 2009 
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health insurance law were passed to achieve universal coverage in 2015. As a result, the number 
of contributors has grown quickly from 3.2 million in 1996 to 8.1 million in 2009 [4]. Still, social 
security coverage remains low at 38.8% [4]. According to the Vietnam Social Security Agency 
(VSS), unpaid social security amounted to 12,960 billion VND in 2017 1.  
The context of Vietnam offers a unique firm-level dataset on one particular type of 
contribution evasion: deferment. The VSS has been facing the issue of many firms falling behind 
on their social security contribution. The VSS dubs them “social security contribution indebted” 
(hereafter SSCI for brevity) firms. As part of its effort to ensure worker welfare, the government 
passed the 2014 Vietnam Social Security Law, making contribution deferment a chargeable 
offense starting January 1st, 2018, and has vowed to step up on the legal enforcement effort. 
Consequently, the amount of contribution owed to the VSS declined in 2018 but remained 
significant at 7,000 billion VND 2. As a warning, the VSS offices in the four major cities (Ha Noi, 
Ho Chi Minh City, Da Nang, and Hai Phong) have made public the lists of local SSCI firms. This 
study uses such lists to identify the SSCI firms among the 873 public firms headquartered in those 
cities that have firm-level data available as of December 2018. Using these data, we are able to 
empirically test whether state and foreign ownerships, profitability, level of debt, size, number of 
employees, and number of branches influence contribution deferment 3. The extant literature 
suggests that these are important factors related to corporate misconduct such as tax avoidance, 
accounting fraud, earnings management, and contribution evasion specifically [4, 9, 11, 16, 19, 
23]. There have been several studies that examine whether Vietnamese small and medium 
enterprises (SMEs) benefit from expanding or evading contribution [3, 4, 14, 21]. However, the 
characteristics of firms evading social security contributions remain unexplored. Our analysis 
would help draw a better picture of SSCI firms. 
In the second part of our analysis, we proceed to examine the impact of being SSCI on firm 
market value. An SSCI firm may benefit from delaying the social security contribution and using 
the cash for other more urgent or beneficial purposes. This could lead to an increase in the firm’s 
value. However, if the firm is charged and persecuted by the government due to contribution 
deferment, the related cost (such as legal fee, penalty, and operation disruption) would be 
significant. In this case, the firm could face a decline in market value. Moreover, the operating 
performance of SSCI firms may suffer from declined motivation and productivity of employees 
[3, 4, 14, 21]. Thus, it is important to examine the effect of being SSCI on firm market value. A 
positive (negative) relationship between being SSCI and firm market value would suggest that it 
is (is not) in the interest of the shareholders that a firm defers its social security contribution. 




3 We detail our hypotheses development in part 2 of this paper. 
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Our study makes several important contributions. First, we add to the literature on social 
security contribution evasion as the first to provide further empirical analysis to Nyland et al. on 
the characteristics of firms that evade contribution [17]. More generally, by investigating 
contribution deferment, we contribute to the literature on corporate misconduct, which has 
mainly focused on other activities such as tax avoidance, accounting fraud, and earnings 
management [1, 9, 10, 11, 13, 16, 23]. Second, previous studies have documented the positive effect 
of increasing social security coverage on long-term firm operating performance in Vietnam [14, 
21]. We complement these studies by investigating the Price-to-Book ratio and total market value 
of SSCI firms. Our analysis also adds to the huge literature on factors influencing firm value by 
identifying SSCI as a potential factor [2, 7, 22]. 
This paper proceeds as follows. We review the related literature and develop our 
hypotheses in part 2. We describe the research methods and data in parts 3 and 4. In part 5, we 
present and discuss the results. Part 6 concludes this paper. 
2 Related literature and hypotheses development 
2.1 Characteristics of SSCI firms 
As social contribution deferment is a form of corporate wrongdoing, we develop our 
hypotheses regarding the characteristics of SSCI firms according to the literature related to 
corporate wrongdoing. From the literature, we identify four main attributes that could influence 
a firm to engage in social security contribution deferment. The attributes are state ownership, 
foreign ownership, profitability, and the level of debt. 
State ownership 
The extant literature suggests a mixed relationship between state ownership and corporate 
wrongdoing. On the one hand, a state-owned firm is likely to be scrutinized more by the 
government. Besides, they could be under the pressure of the government to set good examples. 
As a result, state-owned firms may refrain from wrongdoings. Furthermore, state-owned firms 
have certain privileges and better access to resources, leading to less need to get involved in 
misconduct to boost their financial results. Wang & Yung find a lower probability of corporate 
fraud and earnings management for state-owned firms [23]. Analysing the effective tax rate of 
listed firms in Vietnam, Nguyen Tran Thai Ha & Phan Gia Quyen show that higher state 
ownership is associated with lower tax avoidance [16]. Nyland et al. document that state-owned 
firms are less likely to evade social security contribution [17]. This leads to our first hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1a: State-owned firms are less likely to be SSCI 
On the other hand, political connection plays an important role in developing countries 
where laws and regulations may not be effectively enforced when firms have powerful political 
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allies [10]. Hou & Moore [10] and Shi et al. [20] find fewer incidents of enforcement against 
fraudulent in state-owned firms. This could lead to a higher propensity for misconduct in state-
owned firms. In the case of social security deferment, state-owned firms may count on the 
government to be more tolerant to them (for example, giving them more time to catch up with 
the contribution requirement). This leads to our alternative hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1b: State-owned firms are more likely to be SSCI 
Foreign ownership 
Kim & Yoon [9] and Hasnan et al. [13] find that firms with increased foreign ownership are 
less likely to be involved in earnings management and financial reporting frauds. In contrast, 
Salihu et al. document a positive relationship between foreign ownership and tax avoidance in 
Malaysia [19]. This suggests a non-conclusive role of foreign investors in monitoring and keeping 
firms from misconduct. In the context of Vietnam, a foreign-owned SSCI firm that has not paid 
the social security contribution may leave the country without paying it. The government can 
pursue international legal actions against such firms, but it would be difficult and costly. This 
leads us to form Hypothesis 2a that foreign-owned firms are more likely to defer the contribution. 
On the contrary, foreign-owned entities who wish to operate in the long-term in Vietnam are 
expected to comply with the contribution scheme since they cannot count on the political 
connection as the local firms to buffer against law enforcement. Furthermore, they may have the 
code of conduct of the parent firms to adhere to. As a result, we also propose Hypothesis 2b that 
firms with foreign ownership are less likely to be SSCI.  
Hypothesis 2a: Firms with foreign ownership are more likely to be SSCI. 
Hypothesis 2b: Firms with foreign ownership are less likely to be SSCI. 
Profitability and level of debt 
It is evident that firms struggling with low profitability and/or high debt are more likely to 
be SSCI. In fact, these could be the two most important factors influencing a firm being SSCI. The 
reason is that such firms are probably running low on cash/liquidity. As a result, they might resort 
to options such as tax avoidance or social security contribution deferment to conserve cash. In 
fact, Richardson et al. [16] and Nguyen Tran Thai Ha & Phan Gia Quyen [18] show a positive 
relationship between tax avoidance and financial distress. Thus, we propose the following 
hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 3: Firms with lower profitability are more likely to be SSCI. 
Hypothesis 4: Firms with higher debt are more likely to be SSCI. 
 




We follow Nyland et al. and control for firm size and the number of employees [17]. 
While larger firms could be more financially sound, they also have more employees, thus bearing 
a bigger social security contribution obligation. Furthermore, we also control for the number of 
branches/offices. The reason is that if one of the branches or offices defers its contribution, the 
firm is listed as SSCI. Therefore, having more branches/offices might increase the risk of being 
SSCI.  
2.2 Market value of SSCI firms 
Having identified the characteristics of SSCI firms, the second part of our analysis 
investigates their market values. Similar to other corporate misconduct, such as tax avoidance 
and earnings management, social security contribution deferment has both advantages and 
disadvantages [5, 6, 12]. On the one hand, the firm could direct the deferred contribution to 
projects that are more urgent or beneficial. This will increase the market value of the firm. 
However, if the firm is persecuted by the government, the cost (legal fee, fines, operation 
disruption, reputation, etc.) will be considerable and firm value will be hammered. Besides, firms 
failing to enhance labour welfare, such as social security coverage, are shown to have poorer 
performance in the long-term due to deteriorated worker satisfaction and productivity [4, 14, 21]. 
Considering these opposing forces that influence the market value of SSCI firms, we propose the 
two alternative hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 5a: Market values are higher for SSCI firms. 
Hypothesis 5b: Market values are lower for SSCI firms. 
3 Methods 
3.1 Characteristics of SSCI firms 
We employ a probit regression model to test the relationship of our explaining variables 
and a firm’s probability of being SSCI: 
SSCIi =  + 1 × SOi  + 2 × FOi  + 3 × PROFITi  + 4 × DEBTi  + 5 × SIZEi  + 6 × EMPLi  +                                     
7 × BRANCHi                                                                                                                                            (1) 
where i denotes the firm. Our dependent variable is SSCI, which takes the value of 1 if a firm is 
SSCI and 0 otherwise. State-owned firms are indicated by dummy variable SO, which takes a 
value of 1 if the state ownership in the firm is at least 20% and 0 otherwise. The 20% threshold is 
used by the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) as an indication for influential 
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ownership 4. Similarly, foreign-owned firms are indicated by dummy variable FO, which takes a 
value of 1 if foreign investors own 20% of the firm or higher and 0 otherwise 5. Profitability 
(PROFIT) is measured by the net profit margin in percentage. The level of debt (DEBT) is the total 
debt over total assets ratio. Control variables include SIZE, the natural logarithm of the firm’s 
total assets in billion VND; EMPL, the natural logarithm of the number of employees; and 
BRANCH, the number of branches/offices a firm has.  
3.2 Market value of SSCI firms 
To test the impact of being SSCI on firm market value, we run the following OLS 
regression:  
VALUEi =  + 1 × SSCIi  + 2 × SOi  + 3 × FOi  + 4 × PROFITi  + 5 × DEBTi  + 6 × SIZEi  + 7 × EMPLi 
+ 8 × BRANCHi                                                                                                                    (2) 
where the firm market value (VALUE) is proxied by the Price-to-Book ratio (PB) and the natural 
logarithm of the total market value in VND billion (MKTVAL), respectively. We also include the 
exchange- and industry-fixed effects in this model. The firms in our sample are traded in four 
exchange venues (the Ho Chi Minh Stock Exchange, the Hanoi Stock Exchange, the Unlisted 
Public Companies Exchange – UpCom, and the OTC market). Each venue or industry may have 
distinctive features that affect the level of the Price-to-Book ratio and total market value of traded 
firms. Industry classification follows Vietnam's Standard Industrial Classification.  
4 Data summary and univariate tests 
Our data include 873 public firms headquartered in Ho Chi Minh, Ha Noi, Da Nang, and 
Hai Phong, of which 4.12% are SSCI firms. We identify SSCI firms by using the lists published by 
the VSS offices in these cities. We collect the firm-level data for the fiscal year 2018 from Stoxplus. 
The fiscal year-end market price used to calculate PB and MKTVAL is available from Stoxplus. 
Table 1 summarizes the data. It also includes the results of the t-test of the difference in means 
between the SSCI and non-SSCI firms for each variable as a univariate test for our hypotheses. 
The t-test results reveal that the mean SO of SSCI firms is lower (statistically significant at the 10% 
level) than that of non-SSCI firms; the mean PROFIT is lower (significant at the 1% level); and the 
mean DEBT is higher (significant at the 1% level). This suggests that, on average, SSCI firms are 
less likely to be state-owned, and have lower profit, and higher debt. The t-test results for PB and 
MKTVAL imply a lower market value (statistically significant at the 1% level) of SSCI firms in 
general. 
                                                 
4 https://www.ifrs.org/issued-standards/list-of-standards/ias-28-investments-in-associates-and-joint-ventures/ 
5 Our results are qualitatively similar when we use the 25% or 15% threshold. 
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Table 2 shows the correlations between the variables. The sign and significance of the 
correlation coefficients between SSCI and SO, PROFIT, DEBT, PB, and MKTVAL further support 
the t-test results in Table 1.  
Table 1. Summary of data 
Variable Num. Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Difference between SSCI and 
non-SSCI firms 
SSCI 873 0.041 0.199 
Firm characteristics variables 
SO 873 0.467 0.499 –0.140* (–1.65) 
FO 873 0.109 0.312 –0.056 (–1.05) 
PROFIT 873 3.918 25.843 –19.930*** (–4.58) 
DEBT 873 0.510 0.238 0.216*** (5.41) 
SIZE 873 6.414 1.913 0.056 (0.20) 
EMPL 873 5.438 1.455 –0.061 (–0.25) 
BRANCH 873 2.200 5.917 0.197 (0.20) 
Firm market value variables 
PB 873 1.243 1.127 –0.591*** (–3.10) 
MKTVAL 873 5.327 1.968 –1.112*** (–3.34) 
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1% level, respectively, t-statistics are in 
parentheses. 
 
Table 2. Correlations 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
SSCI (1) 1          
SO (2) –0.056a 1         
FO (3) –0.036 –0.106c 1        
PROFIT (4) –0.153c 0.027 0.049 1       
DEBT (5) 0.181c 0.097c –0.032 –0.245c 1      
SIZE (6) 0.007 –0.058a 0.227c 0.168c 0.236c 1     
EMPL (7) –0.008 0.205c 0.119c 0.092c 0.212c 0.469c 1    
BRANCH (8) 0.007 –0.013 0.105c –0.009 0.033 0.135c 0.116c 1   
PB (9) –0.104c 0.027 0.110c –0.072b –0.005 0.142c 0.173c 0.089c 1  
MKTVAL (10) –0.112c –0.028 0.261c 0.323c –0.095c 0.084c 0.445c 0.137c 0.471c 1 
a, b, and c denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1% level, respectively 
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5 Results and discussion 
5.1 Multivariate test results on the characteristics of SSCI firms 
Table 3 presents the results of the probit regression detailed in Equation (1). Columns (1) 
to (4) show the results for each of the four main variables (SO, FO, PROFIT, and DEBT) without 
controls. Column (5) presents the result of the full model. We discuss the result in column (5). 
The coefficient for SO is negative and significant at the 5% level. This suggests that state-owned 
firms are less likely to defer their social security contribution, supporting Hypothesis 1a over 
Hypothesis 1b. Because the government considers contribution deferment a severe offense and 
makes the list of SSCI firms public, it is reasonable that state-owned firms will try to comply with 
the contribution schedule. Political connection does not help in this case since fencing a state-
owned firm from the government’s charge will draw much publicity and political risk. Moreover, 
state-owned firms may have better access to resources (finance, customers, etc.) than non-state-
owned firms. Therefore, they could be in better shape financially, making it less likely that they 
will need to defer their contribution for liquidity reasons.  
 The coefficient for FO is insignificant, supporting neither Hypothesis 2a nor 2b. This 
indicates that foreign investors play an insignificant role in whether a firm delays its social 
security contribution. The reason could be that the two opposite factors underlying Hypothesis 
2a and 2b cancel out each other, or it could simply be that foreign investors are not actively 
involved in this matter. The coefficients for PROFIT and DEBT back our Hypothesis 3 and 4. The 
Table 3. Probit regression results on the characteristics of SSCI firms 
 Dependent variable: SSCI 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
SO –0.260* (–1.65)    –0.357** (–1.98) 
FO  –0.323 (–1.07)   –0.265 (–0.78) 
PROFIT   –0.008*** (–3.76)  –0.005** (–2.06) 
DEBT    2.209*** (4.99) 2.123*** (4.56) 
SIZE     –0.032 (–0.51) 
EMPL     0.019 (0.27) 
BRANCH     0.005 (0.33) 
Constant –1.629*** (–16.80) –1.709*** (–21.59) –1.749*** (–22.27) –3.079*** (–10.02) –2.775*** (–5.74) 
N 873 873 873 873 873  
Pseudo R2 0.009 0.004 0.042 0.109 0.144 
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1% level, respectively, t-statistics are in 
parentheses 
 
Jos.hueuni.edu.vn                                                                                                                    Vol. 129, No. 5A, 2020 
 
25 
coefficient for PROFIT is negative and significant at the 5% level. The coefficient for DEBT is 
positive and highly significant at the 1% level. This implies that a firm’s financial status strongly 
influences it being SSCI. Evidently, if a firm is struggling with low profit and high debt, it may 
consider deferring the social security contribution and use the money for other urgent purposes. 
Despite the risk of being persecuted by the government, the firm could be hoping that it could 
turn the money around and pay the contribution debt before it is persecuted.  
The coefficients for the control variables are insignificant, suggesting that firm size, number 
of employees, and number of branches/offices do not critically affect firms’ propensity to defer 
their social security contributions. The pseudo R2 for columns (1) to (4) is 0.9, 0.4, 4.2, and 10.9%, 
respectively. This indicates that PROFIT and DEBT have the most explaining power for SSCI. The 
pseudo R2 for the full model in column (5) is 14.4%. 
5.2 Multivariate test results on the impact of being SSCI on firm market value 
The results of the OLS regression on the impact of being SSCI on firm market value, 
detailed in Equation (2), are shown in Table 4. Columns (1) and (2) present the results when using 
PB as the measure for market value, and columns (3) and (4) present the results when using 
MKTVAL. The coefficient for SSCI is consistently negative and significant, at least at the 5% level 
across the four columns. A coefficient of –0.422 for SSCI in column (2) means that PB is 0.422 
Table 4. OLS regression results on the market values of SSCI firms 
 Dependent variable: PB  Dependent variable: MKTVAL 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
SSCI –0.393** (–2.06) –0.422** (–2.22)  –0.055** (–2.03) –0.388*** (–2.80) 
SO  –0.015 (–0.19)   0.097* (1.67) 
FO  0.275** (2.22)   0.271*** (3.01) 
PROFIT  0.002 (0.98)   0.006*** (5.77) 
DEBT  0.125 (0.69)   –1.972*** (–14.90) 
SIZE  0.054* (1.75)   0.931*** (41.44) 
EMPL  0.084*** (2.61)   0.101*** (4.35) 
BRANCH  0.012* (1.56)   0.006 (1.36) 
Fixed effects Exchange, Industry Exchange, Industry  Exchange, Industry Exchange, Industry 
Constant 1.084*** (3.47) 0.221 (0.62)  5.333*** (11.63) –0.411 (–1.60) 
N 873 873  873 873 
Adjusted R2 0.056 0.089  0.291 0.833 
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1% level, respectively, t-statistics are in 
parentheses 
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lower when the firm is SSCI. Consider that the mean PB in our sample is 1.243 (see Table 1), and 
this implies an average decrease of 34% in the Price-to-Book ratio for SSCI firms. A similar 
analysis shows that a coefficient of –0.388 for SSCI in column (4) indicates a 32% decline in market 
value for SSCI firms 6. Overall, we find substantially lower values for SSCI firms, supporting 
Hypothesis 5b over Hypothesis 5a. The adjusted R2 in the full models in columns (2) and (4) is 
8.9% and 83.3%, respectively.  
6 Conclusions 
This paper analyses the characteristics of firms engaging in social security contribution 
deferment. The context of Vietnam allows the empirical analysis of 873 public firms. We find that 
firms with deteriorated financial status, i.e., low profit and high debt, are more likely to be social-
security-contribution-indebted firms. Furthermore, state-owned firms generally comply with 
their contribution requirement. Other firm-level characteristics, including foreign ownership, 
size, number of employees, and number of branches/offices, have insignificant relationships with 
the probability of a firm being social security contribution indebted. Our findings have important 
implications for regulators, investors, and shareholders. First, our results indicate that, in the 
context of Vietnam, financially struggling firms may consider contribution deferment as an 
option to cope with their financial distress. To prevent this, the government should employ 
stricter policies on social security contribution collection that would preclude firms from 
accumulating large contribution debts. For example, the government could impose interest or 
penalties on contribution debts. Second, the lower market value and the Price-to-Book ratio of 
SSCI firms imply that the risk of being persecuted is reflected in the market price of the firm 
equity. It outweighs any potential benefit from using the contribution money for other purposes. 
Stakeholders of SSCI firms should carefully consider this risk. 
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